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In important respects, Gordon Silverstein’s book Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes,
Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics offers a new, or at least more nuanced, answer
to a very old question. Late in the book, Silverstein serves up the obligatory
quote on the subject he is addressing—Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that
“scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question” (267). Unlike most of us who have
quoted that chestnut, however, Silverstein allows Tocqueville to continue:
“Hence, all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas,
and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings.” And Tocqueville
adds that as politicians, who often enough are lawyers, “introduce the customs
and technicalities of their profession into the management of public affairs,”
the law and its language seep into all the levels of our society, until “at last
the whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate”
(267–68).
That excerpt from Tocqueville gives something of the flavor of the
phenomenon that Silverstein is concerned with here. He labels this tendency
“juridification.” Silverstein offers up a number of definitions of this term—
too many, in fact; it would have helped if he had answered the definitional
question once and firmly rather than taking several cuts at it. Most succinctly,
he defines juridification as the process of “relying on legal process and legal
arguments, using legal language, substituting or replacing ordinary politics
with judicial decisions and legal formality” (5).
So juridification certainly involves the first and most famous part of the
quote from Tocqueville: the American tendency to use the courts to argue and
resolve pressing political questions rather than, or in addition to, the political
process itself. But it also involves a crucial tendency addressed by the rest
of Tocqueville’s quote: the tendency to seek in the political process a more
“lawlike” approach to public policy, one in which political language is narrowed
into legalistic language and we see efforts to “formaliz[e], proceduraliz[e], and
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automat[e] the political process as [a] substitute[ ] or replacement[ ] for the
traditional methods of politics—organizing, electioneering, negotiating, and
bargaining” (15).
Silverstein’s concern is not to argue for or against juridification, any more
than one would argue for or against the weather. He is not on the side of
those who would use the courts as a forum for the solution of any social
problem, or on the side of those who think the courts should never serve as
such a vehicle. Those positions don’t do justice to the myriad permutations
and complications inherent in juridification. Rather, he wants to think about
the causes and consequences of juridification: how and why it occurs and what
its costs and benefits are.
In Silverstein’s account, juridification may be prompted by a variety of
motives and incentives. In some cases, it is, or appears to be, the best possible
option, because institutional or political barriers make it difficult to achieve
public policy changes through the political process. Prison reform, for example,
took a judicial route because of the difficulty of achieving modernization of
the prison system through politics when there was much political cost and
little immediate benefit to politicians in attaching their political reputations
to it (19–20). More generally, as Sanford Levinson, most prominently, would
agree,1 “an eighteenth-century Constitution” produces “significant barriers to
the governance needs of a twentieth- and now twenty-first-century superpower”
(20). The difficulty of achieving political change in the face of an exquisitely
complex system of vertically and horizontally divided power, along with both
constitutional and institutional super-majority voting mechanisms such as the
filibuster, means both that some advocates may turn to the courts, and that
legislators themselves may engage in “legalistic effort[s] to correct the political
process itself,” as in the case of the independent counsel statute (20). Public
interest groups also may turn to the courts to gain political and organizing
benefits, such as “facilitating political organizing efforts, unifying political
movements, or energizing individuals and policy entrepreneurs” (23).
Finally, and intriguingly, Silverstein argues that juridification may appeal
to those for whom law seems to offer “a morally superior path,” one that
is unblemished by the need for compromise (25). Drawing on the work of
Samuel Huntington,2 he suggests that our society moves through periods
of “creedal passion and creedal passivity”—periods in which there is a gap
“between institutions and practices that simply cannot deliver the policies
[that American political] ideals seem to demand” (27). Americans thus crave
“the purity, clarity, and efficiency of judicial rulings and barely tolerat[e] the
gray ambiguity and frustrating inefficiency of the political process” (27). In
our culture, “Law has a luster, a power, an appeal, an allure” (25).
1.

See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes
Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It) (Oxford University Press 2006).
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That is the motivation behind juridification. But how does it occur? The
answer, unsurprisingly, is complicated. Juridification may follow a variety of
patterns. It is not a one-shot affair, Silverstein argues, but “a long, iterated
chain, in which policies and decisions spiral from Court to elected branches,
to administrative agencies, and back into Court—each decision at each step
shaped by those that came before and, in turn, shaping and constraining those
that will follow” (30). Nor, to be sure, is it driven solely by courts or litigants.
Because juridification can enable politicians to sidestep the costs, politically
and in resources expended, of direct action, politicians themselves will often
“facilitate, request, and plead for judicial intervention, happy to surrender
responsibility (and blame) for tough choices” (33).
It will be no surprise that juridification can work more or less well as a
strategy. Silverstein argues that its relative success or failure depends largely
on whether government and the courts are working together, building on each
other’s actions in a constructive pattern, or whether they are locked into a
pattern in which each branch makes decisions that conflict with the other,
leaving law complicated and messy and making it less likely that coherent
policy goals will be achieved. Juridification also is subject to the law of
unintended consequences, and that becomes especially powerful when the
players in this game are unduly optimistic about the possibility of one-shot
interventions.
Silverstein limns the risks and rewards of juridification through a series
of extended studies of public policy controversies and their resolution (or
undoing) through different forms of juridification. His case studies include
the failure to litigate poverty reform in the 1960s and 1970s (95–109), the
“constructive” use of legislation and litigation to effect environmental reform
(128–51), and the “deconstructive” pattern of campaign finance reform,
in which efforts to shape a solution to political corruption were ultimately
constrained by the particular legal frame in which those efforts took place
(152–74). He offers a particularly powerful example of the phenomenon of
unintended consequences, and the importance of recognizing the iterated
nature of public policy in an age of juridification, in his discussion of efforts
to litigate an end to the death penalty. Those efforts resulted in a brief period
of triumph when the Court issued a sweeping ruling holding that the thencurrent death penalty laws were unconstitutional.3 But the triumph collapsed
when state legislators and the Court built on the ruins of the earlier laws to
construct and affirm new death penalty statutes that were far more immune
to challenge.4 The death penalty’s opponents thus “failed to imagine that the
very ruling that would end the death penalty would…ultimately provide a far
more stable platform for its revival and entrenchment” (37–38).

3.
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Silverstein’s basic theory of juridification, and his exemplary use of case
studies to explore that process and its mixed costs and benefits, provides
fertile ground for discussion, both positive and critical. One area that
certainly deserves, and happily has received, increased attention is the central
and potentially problematic role played by policy entrepreneurs, whether
individuals or groups, in the process of juridification. Silverstein observes that
the move to the courts to resolve public policy issues was accompanied by
the influx of “talented and public-spirited young people” into public interest
litigation in and around the Watergate era. The “Nader’s Raiders” and
other public interest lawyers often treated litigation as a preferred means of
achieving social change, and the common tools of political reform, involving
“bargaining, negotiation, and elections,” as “defeats for justice” (9).
By focusing, quite reasonably, on these groups’ normative preference for
the purity of law over politics, Silverstein, however, may give inadequate
attention to the degree to which money—contingency fees, attorneys’ fees and
fund-raising success—also motivated them and continues to do so, for both
liberal and progressive groups alike; he also may be overlooking the extent
to which these groups, once established, are motivated simply by the wish to
continue in existence. One also should note the rise of a new form of policy
entrepreneur: the class action plaintiffs’ lawyers, who describe their actions in
terms of routing around a broken political process but also are plainly working
the system for potentially major financial gains.5 Silverstein devotes a chapter
to the course of the tobacco litigation, which he argues both saved politics,
in the sense that it offered a route toward reform that had been foreclosed by
the political process, and killed it, in the sense that the collapse of the deal
“actually allowed tobacco not only to survive, but also to thrive as a beacon
of profitability in a sea of losses on Wall Street” (11). Still, more could have
been said here about the rise of policy entrepreneurs whose interest in either
politics or litigation is largely strategic and incidental to the market incentives
that drive them.
One also could expand on Silverstein’s brief quotation from an early
argument for public interest litigation as an alternative to the political process,
which observed that the “case and controversy focus of legal activity can
provide one possible alternative to middle class forms of organization and
protest”6 (98). This passage is pregnant with potential areas for exploration.
What does it say about the possibility that public interest litigation, whether
5.

See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Shapo, In the Eye of the Storm: A Regulator’s Perspective on Managed
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in relatively minimal patient-centered gains in managed care policy, and major legal fees for
the lawyers on both sides.
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spearheaded by liberal or conservative groups, is fundamentally a class-specific
activity and one that is bound to reflect the priorities and preferences of those
who engage in it? What does it say if the preference for juridification because
of law’s supposed moral purity is simply a middle-class or professional-class
“taste” for law over politics, which can be a far more bruising activity and
puts the professional’s amour propre at greater risk than simply writing briefs
and standing up in court? And what happens when the priorities of different
groups clash, or when it turns out that “the allocation of public interest law
resources to majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns is contrary to the
[broader] public interest?”7 (107).
One finally might add on this general point that, in keeping with Silverstein’s
account of juridification as an iterated rather than a one-shot process, the rise
of public interest lawyering arguably had two unintended consequences. First,
those who thought of it solely as a “progressive” activity failed to anticipate the
rise of conservative public interest groups that could use the same mechanisms
to achieve their own goals before increasingly sympathetic courts.8 Second, as
with death-penalty litigation, in which the increasingly sophisticated efforts of
public interest groups and pro bono lawyers at white-shoe firms to overturn
convictions and sentences at the federal habeas level resulted in the passage of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,9 the rise of public
interest lawyering occasioned a host of laws and judicial rulings designed to
tighten standing requirements, reduce attorneys’ fees, narrow the scope of
federally funded litigation groups, and otherwise defang public interest law.
Public interest groups that put excessive energy in litigation would find that
they had to retool and rediscover the use of interest-group politics if they
were not to become a vestigial presence. It is perhaps emblematic of this new
era that the current occupant of the White House is a lawyer whose primary
vehicles for legal reform were in community organizing and the messy political
process, not conventional public interest litigation.
Another question that begs for further investigation involves the nature and
number of the players in what Silverstein dubs the “constructive” model of
juridification. His primary example is environmental law and policy, which
he describes as a process of courts and legislators working more or less in
lockstep, each building on the previous actions taken by the other. But, as
he notes, although one of the first moves in this iterated game was the Nixon
White House’s temporary interest in environmental reform, the White House
7.
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lost interest when it became apparent that it would realize minimal political
gains for doing so. Yet, because Congress and the courts continued to push
on this front, Silverstein describes it as a process in which “[t]he branches
were working together with each other” rather than at odds with each other (139,
emphasis in original). This raises the question of whether “working together”
is just a two-branch affair, particularly involving Congress and the courts.
Once those two branches have cooperated to set in motion an enforcement
mechanism whose primary actors are private, what role is there for the
enforcement branch of the national government? What role should there be?
And what are the consequences, either for actual legal reform on that particular
issue or for future issues, of such an approach? Privatizing enforcement may
have its gains: it may render enforcement more responsive and efficient. It also
may have its costs, as the executive branch responds by nominating judges
who take an increasingly stringent view of the impropriety of private rather
than public enforcement.10 My point here, with Silverstein, is not to argue
for or against a particular outcome. But any approach to public policy that
focuses single-mindedly, as legal scholars often do, on the relationship between
Congress and the courts, ultimately will have to account fully for the costs,
benefits, and complexities of the actions not of two branches of government
but three branches or even four if one includes the states.
Perhaps a broader question, but one that should be of great interest to
readers of Silverstein’s book, is the extent to which law’s allure is not just a
matter of, or a response to, iterated steps in a game among repeat players but
instead draws on still deeper impulses. Juridification is not simply a matter
of strategy, or a “product of the interaction of [political] institutions” (4,
emphasis omitted). It ultimately speaks to a broader faith in and focus on law
that is a key feature of our social fabric. As Silverstein observes, “Law’s allure is
deeply embedded in a[n] American political system in which an intentionally
fragmented government interacts with a political culture deeply suspicious of
politics and imbued with a language of rights and rules, liberty and equity”
(245).
Even this passage privileges somewhat the “political system,” rather than
seeing the “political culture” as prior and primary. Elsewhere, Silverstein takes
a somewhat different approach, describing law’s allure as having “something
to do with American political culture itself”—with an American ambivalence
toward politics and attraction toward the seeming “predictability, propriety,
and fairness” of law itself (2–3). Thus, politicians and citizens do not simply
use juridical language because they have been forced onto this ground by
some overhanging judicial decision. They do so voluntarily—and, in a deeper
sense, involuntarily—because the language of the law is a quintessential part of
the American social and political culture.
10.
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Huntington’s observations about the waxing and waning of American
“creedal passions” seem especially pertinent here. It is no accident that the rise
of public interest litigation coincided with Watergate. As Silverstein notes, law’s
allure is closely tied to the “steady erosion of Americans’ faith in their political
process,” well represented by the cataclysmic events of the 1960s (44). But as
he also notes, it goes beyond disaffection with politics and speaks to a broader,
almost theologically inflected faith in the moral purity of law, a faith that has
long been part of the American landscape. This sensibility is richly apparent
in Senator Jacob Javits’ remarks about the independent counsel statute,
whose enactment Silverstein describes as part of juridification’s attraction to
“legalistic solution[s] to…political problem[s]” (181). In words that read like
a technocrat’s impression of Witherspoon or the Mathers, Javits said of the
statute, “For the first time, Congress is making an effort to institutionalize an
instrument of self-purification” (181). So politics is reconceived as law, and
law is reconceived as religion.11 In short, it may be that a full understanding
of juridification and its implications must embrace not only the language of
political science, but that of sociology, and perhaps theology, as well.
A final question to be asked is whether juridification is a problem in search of
a solution, or simply, as I think Silverstein would have it, an inevitable feature
of the American political landscape. Silverstein conceives of juridification in
part as a response to the problem of governing a twenty-first century landscape
with an eighteenth-century document, one that embedded obstacles to
political change in its very DNA.12 So we could imagine reforms—perhaps
minor reforms, like further cutting back on standing to sue in federal court,
or perhaps major ones, like the constitutional reforms proposed by Sanford
Levinson13—designed to curb the appeal of juridification and bring some life
back to the political process itself. We could seek to reduce law’s allure by
returning to a more Madisonian vision of government in which the interests
of those in government are “connected with the constitutional rights of the
place.”14 We could, in short, imagine reforms that do not seek to re-create
11.
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politics in law’s image, but to revivify politics itself. But those reforms seem
unlikely to get off the ground; in any event, as long as law’s allure is immanent
not only in our institutions but in our selves and our social fabric, it is unlikely
that any institutional or constitutional reforms could completely dispel the
urge toward juridification.
That, in turn, suggests two points. First, that is not necessarily always a
bad thing. Silverstein suggests that juridification may be “most problematic
when it dilutes or deflects the ordinary political process that might have been
quite capable, not only of accomplishing the desired goals, but also of doing
so through means and methods of political persuasion and bargaining,” as
in Congress’s attempts to legislate a way out of spiraling budgets (29). But
if juridification can provide a precommitment process that offers political
actors a means of self-restraint (and that is a big if, as the budget process itself
suggests), perhaps we should not be too quick to reject this approach, even if
it has some diminishing effects on politics.
Second, and somewhat conversely, the inevitability of juridification
suggests a tension as to whether the difficulty of achieving public policy goals
is a bug in the current constitutional system or a feature. Silverstein writes
that juridification “seems to be the most defensible and least costly in those
cases where the courts offer the only viable path to get around fundamental
institutional barriers posed by federalism, the separation of powers, or
institutional rules like the filibuster” (29). But if, as he suggests elsewhere,
those constitutional and institutional barriers were put in place precisely to
slow the pace of political change (266), then whether juridification is “most
defensible” in these circumstances, or whether it is instead less defensible, will
depend on our underlying view of the merits of a constitutional system that is
resistant to change absent substantial consensus among the levels and layers
of government.
There is an exquisite irony here, however. Many of those who oppose
juridification do so because they do not believe there should be a way to
work around the safeguards built into the constitutional system as it was
originally designed. But it is precisely those safeguards and difficulties that
make juridification an inevitable part of the public policy process. Plaintiffs’
lawyers, public interest groups and all the rest of the most devoted advocates
of juridification are not so much a perversion of our conservative Constitution
as they are its inevitable by-product.
Still, whatever questions may be left at the end of Law’s Allure, this book is
a valuable place to start for those who want to think about these questions.
Silverstein ends his book by observing that the failure to fully recognize and
understand the phenomenon of juridification and its consequences is in part
a product of the “artificial divide that has grown up between those who study
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law and those who study government and politics”15 (283). He argues that this
divide has narrowed, but the two schools are still running on parallel tracks
rather than working together to understand “how law and politics interact,
shape, and frame each other” (284). Law’s Allure does a fine job of bridging
the gap between the two. It is not, as Silverstein rightly observes, “meant to
be the last word on the subject” of juridification (285). And as Tocqueville’s
words illustrate, it is not the first word on the subject either. But it is a valuable
addition to the conversation.

15.

See e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251 (1997); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across
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